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 NOTE 
Sound and Fury: Substantial Evidence in 
State v. Bruner 
State v. Bruner, No. SD 33982, 2016 WL 4130831 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (en banc) 
Anthony J. Meyer* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With facts as sensational and lurid as any seen in the practice of law, 
State v. Bruner1 has made its way to the Supreme Court of Missouri, where 
the judges will decide what is meant by the phrase “substantial evidence” and 
under what circumstances a defendant in a homicide trial is entitled to a self-
defense instruction.  State v. Bruner has the potential either to clarify a stand-
ard that currently lacks a tenable definition or nudge the fact-finding process 
in jury trials imperceptibly, and impermissibly, outside the province of the 
jury. 
This Note argues that the current standard for substantial evidence is 
both confusing and inconsistent in Missouri case law.  In the instant case, the 
standard for substantial evidence applied by the Missouri Court of Appeals, 
Southern District, involved weighing the credibility of the evidence when, 
according to the weight of authority in Missouri case law, the substantial evi-
dence standard is a low one and does not include making determinations of 
credibility.2  Substantial evidence would be better defined as any evidence 
that is more than a mere scintilla that puts a matter in issue. 
Part II provides a factual summary and the holding of the case.  Part III 
examines Missouri case law for the quantum of evidence meant by substantial 
evidence in the context of self-defense instructions.  Part IV outlines the rea-
soning behind the Southern District’s holding and summarizes Judge Scott’s 
concurring opinion, which focused on prejudice analysis, and Judge Lynch’s 
dissenting opinion, which argued that there was substantial evidence adduced 
to support a self-defense instruction.  Part V proposes an integrated definition 
of substantial evidence and considers the implications of the Southern Dis-
trict’s standard for substantial evidence and those of this Note’s proposed 
alternative.  In considering the implications, Part V includes a discussion of 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2018.  The author is indebted 
to Dean Paul Litton for his superlative teaching and mentorship, grateful for Victoria 
Kassabaum for her unqualified support, and extremely appreciative of members of the 
Missouri Law Review’s Editorial Board for their suggestions for revision. 
 1. No. SD 33982, 2016 WL 4130831, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2016) (en 
banc). 
 2. Id. at *8 (Scott, J., concurring). 
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the effects of a hypothetical mandatory self-defense instruction in homicide 
trials.  Part V ends with a discussion of prejudice analysis.  Part VI provides a 
conclusion. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Jeffrey L. Bruner (“Bruner”) appealed after he was convicted of first-
degree murder and armed criminal action in the Jasper County Circuit Court.3 
In November 2013, Bruner and his wife, Michelle Bruner (“Michelle”), 
were estranged.4  Michelle had moved out approximately two weeks before, 
and, on the evening of November 1, she went to the movies on a date with 
Derek Moore (“Moore”),5 an assistant football coach at Missouri Southern 
State University.  Moore stood at 6’5”, while Bruner was 5’11” and weighed 
170 pounds.6  Michelle posted a picture of herself and Moore outside the 
movie theater on Facebook.7  Bruner’s daughter showed him this picture 
while the two were having dinner.8  Bruner was stunned; he decided to go to 
the theater to confront Michelle.9  Bruner took his daughter home and told her 
that he “didn’t want [her] to see him kill a man,” that she probably would not 
have a mom or dad by the end of the night, and that “he would be going to 
jail that night[.]”10 
Upon arriving home, Bruner looked at the picture again on Facebook.11  
Seething, he took two loaded pistols and an extra ammunition clip and drove 
to the theater.12  After Bruner could not find Michelle’s Jeep in the parking 
lot, he parked facing the theater entrance and waited.13 
When Michelle and Moore came out of the theater, Bruner approached 
them and asked what was going on.14  An argument ensued.15  Bruner told 
Moore, “This doesn’t have to do with you.  I just want to talk to my wife[.]”16  
Moore said, “She moved out pal.”17 
 
 3. Id. at *1 (majority opinion). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.; see also MSSU Assistant Football Coach Killed, ESPN (Nov. 3, 2013), 
http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/9915856/derek-moore-missouri-
southern-state-assistant-killed-shooting. 
 6. Bruner, 2016 WL 4130831, at *2. 
 7. Id. at *1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. (alterations in original). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at *2. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. (alteration in original). 
 17. Id. 
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Moore approached Bruner during the argument, and Bruner took a few 
steps back.18  The two were standing on the edge of the median by the street, 
which Bruner did not want to trip over, so Bruner pivoted around and faced 
Michelle and Moore again.19  At this point, Moore said, “I’m not from here, 
mother fucker, I’ll have your throat slit in two hours.”20  Bruner asked why 
Moore was threatening him.21 
Bruner testified that Moore then stepped onto the median, and Bruner 
perceived that Moore went into a “fighting stance” and moved his arm up to 
grab Bruner.22  While Moore’s back was turned, Bruner drew a pistol from 
his jacket and shot Moore several times in the back, killing him.23  Bruner 
shot Moore several more times when Moore fell to his knees.24 
Witnesses observed that there was an argument preceding the shooting 
in which Bruner yelled at Michelle, but that there was no physical contact 
among any of the three before Moore was shot.25  The only physical contact 
was after Bruner shot Moore; after Moore had collapsed, Bruner kicked him 
in the stomach and head.26 
A high profile, three-day jury trial followed.27  At the jury instructions 
conference, the defense tendered a self-defense instruction28 pursuant to Mis-
souri Approved Instructions (“MAI”)-Criminal 306.06, Part A General 
Statement of Law, which the State opposed.29  The trial court refused to grant 
the instruction.30 
Bruner was convicted of first-degree murder and armed criminal ac-
tion.31  The jury recommended a sentence of life without parole on the mur-
der charge and a sentence of five years’ imprisonment on the armed criminal 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at *2, *5.  There is an inconsistency in Bruner’s testimony in that Bruner 
said Moore faced him in a fighting stance, yet uncontroverted medical proof showed 
that Moore was shot in the back.  Id. at *8 (Scott, J., concurring).  As Judge Scott 
wrote in the concurring opinion, “I cannot do justice to the prosecutor’s certain shred-
ding of Bruner’s credibility on cross-examination, which doubtlessly contributed to 
the outcome.”  Id. at *7 n.1. 
 24. Id. at *5 (majority opinion). 
 25. Id. at *2. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at *2 n.3. 
 29. Id.; MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (CRIMINAL) 306.06A (3D ED.). 
 30. Bruner, 2016 WL 4130831, at *3. 
 31. Id. 
3
Meyer: Sound and Fury
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
534 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
action charge.32  The defense moved for a new trial, citing the court’s refusal 
to grant the self-defense instruction, but the circuit court denied the motion.33 
Bruner appealed on this one point, arguing that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for a new trial because he submitted evidence sufficient 
to receive the self-defense instruction.34  He did not offer a point on his con-
viction for armed criminal action35 or challenge the sufficiency of the evi-
dence on that count.  Compiling the facts most favorable to Bruner, the 
Southern District held that there was no substantial evidence from which a 
reasonable fact-finder could find that Bruner acted in self-defense.36 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
To make a submissible self-defense claim, a defendant must introduce 
substantial evidence of four elements: (1) absence of aggression on the de-
fender’s part, “(2) real or apparent necessity for the defender to kill to save 
herself from an immediate danger of serious bodily injury or death,” “(3) 
reasonable cause for the defender’s belief in such necessity[,] and (4) an at-
tempt by the defender to do all within her power consistent with her personal 
safety to avoid the danger and the need to take a life.”37  The standard is an 
objective one, based on how a hypothetical reasonable and prudent person 
would have acted.38  The evidence to support a self-defense instruction can 
come from the defendant’s testimony alone.39  Further, when substantial evi-
dence is adduced for each element, the trial court must submit a self-defense 
instruction, and failure to do so is reversible error.40  The Supreme Court of 
Missouri has ruled that proper jury instructions, “as to all potential convic-
tions and defenses, [are] so essential to ensure a fair trial that if a reasonable 
juror could draw inferences from the evidence presented the defendant is not 
required to put on affirmative evidence to support a given instruction.”41  
Finally, it should be noted that self-defense is a special affirmative defense, 
and, once self-defense is injected into a case by a defendant, it becomes the 
State’s burden to disprove it.42 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  However, to be convicted of armed criminal action, one must have com-
mitted a criminal act.  State v. Weems, 840 S.W.2d 222, 228 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
 36. Bruner, 2016 WL 4130831, at *3. 
 37. State v. Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196, 200–01 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (citing 
Weems, 840 S.W.2d at 226). 
 38. State v. Smith, 456 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 39. State v. Nunes, 546 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). 
 40. Smith, 456 S.W.3d at 852. 
 41. State v. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 42. State v. Minnis, 486 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Mo. 1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
563.031.5 (West 2017) (defendant has burden of injecting). 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/11
2017] SOUND AND FURY 535 
Before analyzing the specifics of self-defense instructions, it is helpful 
to consider the role of jury instructions in Missouri law.  If an instruction 
from the MAI is applicable to the facts of a case, that instruction must be 
used.43  In the Missouri Practice Series, the authors write that the MAI: 
[T]ell the jury in language it can understand how its findings on ulti-
mate issues of fact affect its verdict.  Basically, they tell the jurors that 
if they believe certain propositions of fact, plaintiff wins; if they do 
not believe any such propositions of fact, plaintiff loses.  Under this 
approach, the jury need not concern itself with the law and instead can 
concentrate on its role as the sole judge of the facts.  The instructions 
already will have applied the law to the facts.44 
Further, “[e]qually as important, the MAI approach leaves evidentiary detail 
to the argument of counsel and submits only the ultimate issues for the jury’s 
resolution by simple and concise instructions.”45  In criminal cases, an in-
struction that is submitted to the jury must be supported by substantial evi-
dence.46 
State v. Smith47 is the most recent Supreme Court of Missouri decision 
discussing when a trial court must submit a self-defense instruction.  In 
Smith, the defendant fired a gun at a man he wrongly thought was accosting 
him and inadvertently hit a victim on a nearby playground.48  In holding that 
the circuit court did not err in refusing to grant a self-defense instruction 
when there was no substantial evidence to support such an instruction, the 
court asserted, “The circuit court must submit a self-defense instruction 
‘when substantial evidence is adduced to support it, even when that evidence 
is inconsistent with the defendant’s testimony,’ and failure to do so is reversi-
ble error.”49 
The most significant issue in the instant case is what quantum of evi-
dence the term “substantial evidence” is meant to signify.50  In State v. Avery, 
which the Bruner court quoted for its rule recitation of substantial evidence, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri noted substantial evidence is simply evidence 
“putting a matter in issue.”51  The court was slightly more verbose, however, 
 
 43. MO. SUP. CT. R. 70.02(b). 
 44. Jeffrey A. Burns, Methods of Practice: Litigation Guide, 2 MO. PRAC., MAI 
Approach to Instructing a Jury § 15.2 (4th ed. 2016). 
 45. Id. 
 46. William A. Knox, Criminal Practice & Procedure, 19 MO. PRAC., Trial 
Framework – Case for the Defense – Instruction to the Jury § 20:19 (3d ed. 2016). 
 47. 456 S.W.3d 849 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 48. Id. at 851. 
 49. Id. at 852 (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d 278, 281 
(Mo. 2002) (en banc)). 
 50. State v. Bruner, No. SD 33982, 2016 WL 4130831, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2016). 
 51. State v. Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
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in State v. Westfall, which came down a year before Avery and was cited 
throughout Bruner; the Westfall court wrote, “The general rule is that an in-
struction must be based upon substantial evidence and the reasonable infer-
ences therefrom.  Substantial evidence . . . requiring instruction may come 
from the defendant’s testimony alone as long as the testimony contains some 
evidence tending to show that he acted in self-defense.”52  Under the Westfall 
rule, a defendant who introduces “some” evidence of self-defense only 
through his own testimony has introduced substantial evidence.53 
The Westfall and Avery courts composed what amounts to an abbreviat-
ed standard for substantial evidence.  Avery, however, cited to State v. Weems 
in its rule recitation that substantial evidence is evidence that puts a matter in 
issue.54  The rule in State v. Weems reads as follows: 
This quantum of proof has been variously defined as “substantial evi-
dence,” . . . “evidence putting it in issue,” . . . “any theory of inno-
cence . . . however improbable that theory may seem, so long as the 
most favorable construction of the evidence supports it,” . . . “support-
ed by evidence,” . . . “any theory of the case which his evidence tend-
ed to establish,” . . . “established defense,” . . . and “evidence to sup-
port the theory.”55 
Weems incorporated into its analysis a 1968 case called State v. McQueen, 
which included the same fleshed-out standards and citations for cases going 
back to 1930.56  In 2003, when Avery summarized this long recitation from 
Weems as simply “evidence putting a matter in issue,”57 it muddled the stand-
ard for the quantum of evidence needed before a defendant receives a self-
defense instruction.  Over the course of decades, courts have recited and re-
phrased the rule so many times it has lost some of its original meaning.  As an 
example of how substantial evidence has lost precision after Avery, consider 
State v. Burks, in which the court wrote that the Appellant argued “there was 
substantial evidence putting that defense in issue.”58 
Weems defined the standard of substantial evidence in the context of 
self-defense instructions by throwing various quanta at the wall to see what 
 
 52. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d at 280 (emphases added) (footnote omitted). 
 53. Note that, on its face, there is no test here for whether or not the evidence 
adduced to support a self-defense instruction is convincing. 
 54. Avery, 120 S.W.3d at 200. 
 55. State v. Weems, 840 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (third alteration 
in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting State v. Rose, 346 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo. 
1961); and then quoting State v. Ford, 130 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo. 1939); State v. 
Kinard, 245 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Mo. 1952); State v. Robinson, 328 S.W.2d 667, 670 
(Mo. 1959); State v. Stallings, 33 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Mo. 1930); State v. Sumpter, 184 
S.W.2d 1005, 1006 (Mo. 1945); State v. Shiles, 188 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Mo. 1945)). 
 56. 431 S.W.2d 445, 448–49 (Mo. 1968). 
 57. Avery, 120 S.W.3d at 200. 
 58. 237 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added). 
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stuck;59 ostensibly, by the time Avery was decided eleven years later, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri had narrowed the language of substantial evidence 
to evidence putting a matter in issue.60  Language, such as that in Weems, that 
substantial evidence could be any “evidence to support the theory”61 – seem-
ingly a lower standard that does not invite a determination of whether a mat-
ter is in issue – was excised from the rule recitations.62  Arguably, it is more 
difficult to put a matter in issue than to offer any evidence to support a theo-
ry.  The upshot is that there is a potential for unpredictable results when sub-
mitting MAI-approved instructions, depending on whether a court decides to 
look for “any evidence” to support the instruction or evidence that puts the 
matter in issue. 
State v. Smith, the most recent Supreme Court of Missouri case on self-
defense instructions, does not delve into what substantial evidence means, 
noting only that when a defendant submits substantial evidence of self-
defense, failure of the circuit court to grant an instruction constitutes reversi-
ble error.63  Because of the confused definitions in Missouri case law, howev-
er, Bruner, as a defendant and appellant, was free to challenge the issue of 
substantial evidence based on language in cases that, while not often cited, 
were not yet overturned. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The Southern District heard State v. Bruner en banc.64  The standard of 
review for a circuit court’s decision not to submit a self-defense instruction is 
de novo.65  The court considered all evidence in the light most favorable to 
the defendant.66 
Bruner had to meet four elements to make a submissible case for a self-
defense instruction: (1) absence of aggression, (2) real or apparent immediate 
danger, (3) a reasonable belief in the necessity to kill to avoid the immediate 
danger, and (4) Bruner’s doing all within his power consistent with personal 
safety to avoid killing.67  If Bruner failed to present substantial evidence on 
any one of these elements, he would lose his appeal.68 
 
 59. Weems, 840 S.W.2d at 226. 
 60. Avery, 120 S.W.3d at 200. 
 61. Weems, 840 S.W.2d at 226 (quoting State v. Shiles, 188 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Mo. 
1945)). 
 62. See State v. Bruner, No. SD 33982, 2016 WL 4130831, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2016). 
 63. State v. Smith, 456 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (citing State v. 
Westfall, 75 S.W.3d 278, 280 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)). 
 64. Bruner, 2016 WL 4130831, at *1. 
 65. Id. at *3 (citing State v. Johnson, 470 S.W.3d 767, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015)). 
 66. Id. (citing Smith, 456 S.W.3d at 852). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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A.  Majority Opinion 
In its majority opinion, the Southern District, compiling the facts most 
favorable to Bruner, held “[t]here was no substantial evidence from which a 
reasonable fact-finder could deduce that there was a real or apparent necessity 
for Bruner to kill in order to save himself from an immediate danger of seri-
ous bodily harm or death.”69 
The court reasoned that there was not a positive quantum of evidence to 
meet the immediate danger element.70  Though Moore was much larger than 
Bruner, the only evidence offered at trial concerning immediacy was that 
Bruner never thought Moore had a knife.71  Further, Moore’s threat to Bruner 
– to have his throat slit in two hours – was not immediate.72  The court rea-
soned Moore’s statement was a “mere threat,” insufficient for self-defense, 
rather than a danger.73  In light of these facts, the court said there was “no 
reasonable available inference from this evidence that would create the im-
mediate danger underlying the right to kill in self-defense.”74 
Finally, the court believed that there was no substantial evidence that 
Bruner did all within his power to avoid taking Moore’s life.75  Although 
Bruner did back away, he himself testified that he should have left the sce-
ne.76  Bruner shot Moore several times while Moore’s back was turned, and 
then when Moore fell to his knees, Bruner shot him several more times.77 
In its analysis, the court quoted at length from State v. Chambers.78  In 
Chambers, the defendant verbally confronted the victim at a bar.79  Both went 
outside, but then the defendant hit the victim with a pistol and shot the victim 
when he got up with his hands in the air.80  The victim did not have a weap-
on.81  The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the circuit court did not err in 
refusing to give a self-defense instruction.82  The court went on, “Further-
more, the evidence which defendant relies upon to support his theory of self-
defense is woefully unconvincing that there existed either an apparent or real 
necessity for him to use deadly force to avoid serious bodily injury or 
death.”83  The court continued, 
 
 69. Id. at *4. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at *5. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. State v. Chambers, 714 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 529–30. 
 81. Id. at 530. 
 82. Id. at 531. 
 83. Id. 
8
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We have conducted a searching examination of the trial transcript and 
have considered the evidence in a light most favorable to defendant, 
and we are unable to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to 
support an instruction on self-defense or to allow the trier of fact to 
conclude that defendant’s conduct was reasonable.84 
Therefore, the Southern District, following Chambers, held that the circuit 
court did not err in failing to submit a self-defense instruction.85  Using lan-
guage that the Supreme Court of Missouri used in Chambers, the Southern 
District wrote that the evidence was “woefully unconvincing to support a 
self-defense instruction.”86 
B.  Concurring Opinion 
Judge Scott wrote a concurring opinion in Bruner.87  He noted that, even 
if an instructional error had occurred, Bruner must prove he would have been 
prejudiced by the error and that the omitted instruction would have changed 
the verdict.88  Judge Scott wrote, 
Perhaps reasonable minds could differ as to error in this case, but not 
prejudice.  If I am sure of anything, I am sure that a self-defense in-
struction would not have changed the verdict; that no reasonable lay or 
legal mind could review the whole record and disagree; and that a se-
cond trial would needlessly increase pain and grief for those on both 
sides of this tragedy.89 
The majority opinion, by contrast, did not engage in prejudice analysis.90 
C.  Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Lynch dissented, arguing that the record contained evidence “put-
ting self-defense at issue.”91  Judge Lynch wrote that the standard of review is 
a constant, “regardless of how improbable the favorable evidence may be or 
how compelling the contrary evidence may be.”92  Appellate courts are for-
bidden from acting as super jurors, and, to the extent that the majority opinion 
 
 84. Id. (emphasis added). 
 85. State v. Bruner, No. SD 33982, 2016 WL 4130831, at *6 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2016). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (Scott, J., concurring). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at *7. 
 90. See id. at *1–6 (majority opinion). 
 91. Id. at *8 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at *9. 
9
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disregarded or ignored evidence that supported Bruner’s contention of self-
defense, the majority fell into a super juror role.93 
Judge Lynch recounted the evidence adduced and noted that at trial 
Bruner said, “[T]hat’s any time there,” after Moore threatened to have Brun-
er’s throat slit, meaning Bruner feared an immediate threat.94  Bruner sensed 
that he was immediately in danger after Moore’s threat.95  Also, Bruner said 
he took the firearms to the theater because of how big Moore was and that if 
Moore “tried to beat [him] up[,] . . . [Bruner] would be able to back him 
off.”96  Finally, Judge Lynch wrote that the jury could consider the notable 
size difference between Bruner and Moore when assessing the danger a rea-
sonable person would have felt in Bruner’s situation.97 
Judge Lynch argued, “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to giving the requested self-defense instruction[,] . . . substantial evidence – 
evidence putting these matters in issue – supports all four [self-defense] ele-
ments.”98  First, there was evidence that Bruner was not the aggressor in that, 
even though Bruner was the one to seek out Michelle and Moore, Moore re-
peatedly moved toward Bruner, threatened to slit Bruner’s throat, assumed a 
fighting stance, and raised his hand toward Bruner in a threatening manner.99  
Second, there was evidence of a real or apparently real necessity for Bruner to 
kill in order to save himself from immediate danger of death or serious bodily 
harm because Bruner believed Moore intended to slit his throat and Moore 
made a movement toward Bruner from a fighting stance.100  Third, there was 
evidence of a reasonable cause for Bruner’s belief in such a necessity because 
of the size difference between the two men.101  Finally, “there was evidence 
of ‘an attempt by [Bruner] to do all within his power consistent with his per-
sonal safety to avoid the danger and the need to take a life’” because Bruner 
said he backed up “countless times” and that he was close to tripping over the 
sidewalk.102 
Judge Lynch wrote, “By definition, therefore, substantial evidence sup-
ported Defendant’s self-defense theory.”103  As such, he believed the circuit 
court erred in refusing to give the self-defense instruction.104 
 
 93. Id. at *9 n.2. 
 94. Id. at *10. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at *9 (first alteration in original). 
 97. Id. at *13. 
 98. Id. at *14. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  Judge Lynch notes that, of course, “whether shooting Moore was a rea-
sonable action given Moore’s size and conduct was for the jury to determine.”  Id. 
 102. Id. (quoting State v. Chambers, 671 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo. 1984) (en banc)).  
Again, Judge Lynch notes that whether this evidence amounted to Bruner doing “all” 
within his power to avoid taking Moore’s life would be a question for the jury.  Id. 
(emphasis omitted). 
 103. Id. at *16. 
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The majority opinion, written by Judge Francis, however, characterized 
the dissent’s reasoning as ignoring the “fundamental requirement that there 
be substantial evidence to support the self-defense instruction.”105 
The Supreme Court of Missouri granted rehearing.  Oral argument in the 
case took place on January 11, 2017.106 
V.  COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of Missouri must decide how substantial evidence 
should be defined in Missouri courts and to what extent the definitions al-
ready present in Missouri case law need clarification.  In deciding, the court 
will elucidate the standard applied by circuit courts in granting self-defense 
instructions in homicide trials, the need for which the Bruner case makes 
clear.  Relatedly, the Supreme Court of Missouri must decide whether, at any 
level, a court should say that evidence adduced to support a self-defense in-
struction in a homicide trial is “woefully unconvincing.”  Finally, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri will decide whether the defendant Bruner should be 
awarded a new trial.  Helpful in the Supreme Court of Missouri’s analysis 
will be that it has three opinions from the Southern District to review, each 
with markedly different reasoning. 
A.  The Substantial Evidence Standard 
First, the Southern District’s holding fails to clarify the varied language 
in Missouri case law as to what substantial evidence is.  Probably the most 
confusing facet of substantial evidence is that the standard is ostensibly mis-
labeled.  In its characterization of Judge Lynch’s dissent, the majority opinion 
supported its holding by relying on the fact that the standard calls for “sub-
stantial” evidence, suggesting that the evidence must be weighty.107  Howev-
er, the term substantial evidence by itself implies something greater than the 
actual legal standard, which, according to Westfall, could be as little as 
“some” evidence from the defendant’s own testimony.108  In this sense, the 
standard substantial evidence is mislabeled and might lead judges astray 
merely by its name. 
The Bruner majority opinion is written in the Avery/Smith mold and 
adopts the standard that substantial evidence means “putting a matter in is-
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at *4 (majority opinion). 
 106. See generally Oral Argument, State v. Bruner, SC95877 (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://www.courts.mo.gov/SUP/index.nsf/fe8feff4659e0b7b8625699f0079eddf/3aa07
9d29e3da9ca8625806f007db81f?OpenDocument. 
 107. Brunner, 2016 WL 4130831, at *4. 
 108. State v. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d 278, 280 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
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sue.”109  Although this language is elegant, the reasoning the Bruner court 
gives to support its holding – essentially a weighing of the evidence adduced 
that cuts against self-defense rather than examining the record for evidence to 
support self-defense – does not support this rule.110 
The Bruner court possibly applied the substantial evidence standard in-
correctly.  The standard of review was de novo, and the court was to review 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.111  The facts most 
favorable to Bruner are the size difference between himself and Moore; that 
Moore threatened to have Bruner’s throat slit; that Moore advanced on Brun-
er, who had to back up; and that Moore assumed a fighting stance and raised 
an arm immediately before Bruner drew and fired.112  Furthermore, although 
some of Bruner’s testimony contradicts this point, such as what Bruner said 
to his daughter before leaving for the theater,113 Bruner said at trial that he 
only went to the theater to talk to Michelle.114  If substantial evidence merely 
means putting a matter in issue, Bruner’s testimony may freely contradict 
itself.  It goes without saying that Bruner’s testimony may also contradict that 
of other witnesses.  One can argue that Bruner made a colorable argument 
that he put self-defense in issue because of the evidence he produced.  How-
ever, one can only make this argument if one precisely applies the standard of 
review, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.  It 
does not appear the Bruner court did that. 
Most troubling about the holding in Bruner is its reliance on Chambers.  
The analysis in Chambers, which allows a court to evaluate whether evidence 
to support a self-defense instruction is “woefully unconvincing,”115 does not 
comport with the legal standard of substantial evidence.  Such analysis is 
analogous to allowing a trial court to direct a verdict for the State in a crimi-
nal trial by preventing a defendant from presenting what is possibly his best 
argument.  Instructions exist to guide the jurors in their verdict.  When a trial 
court refuses a self-defense instruction, the jury is left with the choice to con-
vict or acquit because the State did not meet its burden.  The circuit court 
should have tendered the instruction and let the jury determine the credibility 
of the evidence.  However, in holding that there was no substantial evidence, 
the Bruner court evaluated what evidence was reasonable rather than simply 
evaluating whether the evidence Bruner offered put self-defense in issue.116  
Indeed, Bruner’s holding suggests that substantial evidence is not evidence 
 
 109. Bruner, 2016 WL 4130831, at *3 (quoting State v. Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196, 
200 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)). 
 110. See generally id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at *10 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 113. See id. at *1 (majority opinion). 
 114. See id. at *9 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 115. State v. Chambers, 714 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). 
 116. See Bruner, 2016 WL 4130831, at *3. 
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that puts a matter in issue but evidence by which a fact-finder could reasona-
bly find a matter in issue.117 
Although the circuit court retains a gatekeeper function for jury instruc-
tions, the real thrust of substantial evidence is “putting a matter in issue,” 
which might be defined as whether reasonable minds could disagree on 
whether a defendant acted in self-defense.118  Judge Lynch’s dissent correctly 
illustrates how reasonable minds could come to such a disagreement in the 
instant case.119  The Bruner and Chambers courts seem to be starting their 
analyses of whether defendants are entitled to self-defense instructions based 
on whether the inferences from the evidence adduced are reasonable.120  The 
question facing appellate courts, however, is narrower: it is whether the four 
elements of self-defense are in issue.  The standard Bruner and Chambers 
employed is too concerned with the weight of the evidence, when, according 
to Missouri case law, substantial evidence should be a generous standard for 
the defendant. 
The problem courts face in composing their rule recitations for substan-
tial evidence is where to put the modifier “reasonably.”121  This Note argues 
that the Bruner court conflated a jury’s being able to reasonably find that 
Bruner acted in self-defense with whether the inferences from the small 
amount of evidence that Bruner did act in self-defense were reasonable.  The 
distinction is critical.  No one argues that a jury should be allowed to make 
unreasonable inferences; courts can protect against them by evaluating the 
reasonableness of the inferences from the direct evidence.  However, a court 
should not evaluate whether a jury could reasonably find self-defense; putting 
the modifier “reasonably” before the verb “find” is not an analysis permitted 
by the rule articulated in Westfall.122  This Note thus proposes that the most 
tenable solution is a definition for substantial evidence that dispenses with a 
reasonableness requirement.  Substantial evidence should be defined as evi-
dence that is more than a mere scintilla that puts a matter in issue.  This 
standard, as argued below, is compatible with the fundamental protections 
afforded to criminal defendants and safeguards the adversarial system.123 
 
 117. See id. 
 118. State v. Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); see also Bruner, 
2016 WL 4130831, at *7 (Scott, J., concurring). 
 119. See Bruner, 2016 WL 4130831, at *12 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 120. See id. at *4 (majority opinion); see also Chambers, 714 S.W.2d at 531. 
 121. See State v. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d 278, 280 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 122. Id. (“Substantial evidence of self-defense requiring instruction may come 
from the defendant’s testimony alone as long as the testimony contains some evidence 
tending to show that he acted in self-defense.”). 
 123. This Note reluctantly puts forward a definition using the quantum scintilla.  
Missouri courts are reticent in using scintilla as a quantum of evidence.  See Strauss v. 
Am. Chewing Gum Co., 114 S.W.73, 74 (Mo. 1908).  However, a scintilla most accu-
rately reflects the notion of “substantial” as defined in State v. Westfall.  75 S.W.3d at 
280. 
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B.  Implications 
Language in Bruner and Chambers allowing a judge to evaluate whether 
certain evidence is unconvincing is troublesome.  In deciding that certain 
pieces of evidence are “woefully unconvincing” in supporting a self-defense 
theory, the appellate court usurps a traditional jury function and acts as a su-
per juror.124  The analysis in Bruner’s case should have stopped when Bruner 
put forth some evidence, regardless of the credibility of that evidence, of all 
four elements for self-defense – Bruner should have received the instruction. 
It would be far easier for circuit courts, running fewer risks of reversals, 
to allow instructions in cases similar to Bruner.  Ironically for both the 
Chambers and Bruner courts, the cases in which the evidence supporting self-
defense really is woefully unconvincing are precisely the cases in which cir-
cuit courts should be least concerned about tendering the instruction, as the 
juries in those cases are not likely to be convinced by the weak evidence of a 
self-defense claim. 
Judge Lynch’s dissent should play a crucial role in the Supreme Court 
of Missouri’s analysis.  His dissent shows that, even though there is signifi-
cant credible evidence to negate self-defense as a theory,125 there was enough 
evidence to put all four elements of self-defense in issue.  If the Supreme 
Court of Missouri chooses to follow Judge Lynch’s dissent, one policy issue 
that might arise would be that of the legally savvy but unscrupulous defend-
ant who injects self-defense into the case through his own testimony or that of 
a third party.  As argued in 2002 by Professor William A. Schroeder, charac-
ter evidence, especially in self-defense cases, can make it into evidence de-
spite protections in place under Missouri evidence law.126  Professor 
Schroeder writes, “No doubt, in trial settings, evidence of character and other 
acts can sometimes [obfuscate] and confuse more than it helps.  Even the 
worst person can probably find someone who will say good things about him, 
and even the best people have detractors.”127  Thus, if substantial evidence is 
defined as evidence that is more than a mere scintilla that puts a matter in 
issue, and not as a positive quantum of reasonable evidence, future defend-
ants could attempt to receive self-defense instructions merely by introducing 
character evidence. 
 
 124. See Chambers, 714 S.W.2d at 531; Bruner, 2016 WL 4130831, at *9 n.2 
(Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 125. See Bruner, 2016 WL 4130831, at *8 (Lynch, J., dissenting).  Because there 
was sufficient evidence to support a self-defense instruction, but no evidence suffi-
cient to support a self-defense theory, Bruner might not have been prejudiced by the 
circuit court’s error. 
 126. See William A. Schroeder, Evidence Issues in Assault and Homicide Cases 
Where Self-Defense Is Claimed, 58 J. MO. B. 70, 75 (2002). 
 127. Id. 
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This defense strategy is not necessarily a game-changer.  Defendants 
themselves will avoid testifying,128 but if a defendant could call a witness 
capable of testifying as to the elements of a self-defense claim, that defendant 
would be entitled to an instruction.  Over the long run, a proliferation of self-
defense instructions might result, with at least a few defendants being acquit-
ted on self-defense grounds.  Moreover, not only will there be an influx of 
spurious self-defense instructions, but there will also be a subsequent misal-
location of judicial resources.  As Professor Schroeder noted, 
Where the acts in question are disputed, there is more of a problem.  If 
extrinsic evidence is offered, there will be direct examination, cross-
examination, and possibly rebuttal witnesses.  The result is the con-
sumption of a great deal of time to prove something that may not be 
especially important.129 
Even more problematic for the State is that the ultimate defense strategy 
will become defendants attempting to prevent circuit courts from tendering 
self-defense instructions.  In accordance with Missouri law, a circuit court 
plainly errs (even if the issue is not preserved for appellate review) if it fails 
to instruct the jury on an issue it should have.130  Thus, defendants have a 
commensurate incentive to seek a new trial by injecting even the flimsiest 
self-defense evidence into a case with the hope that the circuit court refuses to 
grant the instruction. 
Such an incentive structure presents at least two questions: first, should 
there actually be some sort of a reasonableness safeguard on self-defense 
evidence?  Or are the few unscrupulous defendants’ acquittals balanced out 
by the overall increased fairness of the criminal justice system and the addi-
tional benefit of ensuring that fact-finding in criminal trials is more complete-
ly left to the province of the jury?  Second, in homicide cases, is there any-
thing wrong with a mandatory or automatic self-defense instruction? 
First, even though this Note previously argued against it, consider a rea-
sonableness standard for the evaluation of self-defense evidence before an 
instruction is tendered.  There is a danger in allowing a jury to hear spurious 
self-defense evidence.  Parsing the legal standard for substantial evidence, 
however, is critical.  Judges are allowed to rule as a matter of law under 
Avery131 what inferences from evidence proffered are reasonable in deciding 
whether or not to allow a self-defense instruction; however, judges cannot 
rule on whether or not the direct evidence itself is reasonable.132  This means 
 
 128. Beal v. State, 209 S.W.3d 542, 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (“There is no re-
quirement that a defendant testify in order for a self-defense instruction to be given.  
The instruction is required if there is substantial evidence of self-defense even when 
the defendant does not testify or otherwise offer any evidence at trial.”). 
 129. Schroeder, supra note 126, at 76. 
 130. Knox, supra note 46, § 20:19. 
 131. See State v. Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196, 200–201 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 132. See State v. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d 278, 280–81 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
15
Meyer: Sound and Fury
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
546 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
that if there is direct evidence of self-defense, from which no inferences need 
to be drawn, the judge should be precluded from determining whether the 
evidence is reasonable.133  Allowing judges to assess the reasonableness of all 
evidence before tendering a self-defense instruction is too similar to a di-
rected verdict in that if a judge rules based on this reasoning, a jury will not 
have the option to acquit based on a self-defense instruction.  Motions for 
directed verdicts are abolished in Missouri.134  Therefore, any reasonability 
test incorporated into the substantial evidence doctrine must be met with a 
great deal of skepticism.  In the end, avoiding what looks like a directed ver-
dict and allowing the jury alone to assess the credibility of direct evidence 
showing self-defense likely outweighs the danger posed by allowing flimsy 
evidence into a trial.  
Regarding the second issue, Missouri courts could adopt a mandatory or 
automatic self-defense instruction in homicide cases.135  An automatic self-
defense instruction in homicide cases would protect against disputes about 
jury instructions from occurring at both the trial and appellate levels.  Further, 
an automatic self-defense instruction in homicide cases has the added benefit 
of not incentivizing those unscrupulous defendants to inject the issue of self-
defense into the case in the hopes of not getting an instruction and then over-
turning the verdict on appeal.136  That spurious testimony can stay out of evi-
dence altogether.  
To allow defendants in homicide trials to have the added protection of a 
mandatory instruction would be incredibly unpopular.  Similarly, there would 
certainly be debate as to whether this protection is even necessary to ensure a 
fair trial.  However, one need look no further than the Bruner case to see the 
possible benefits of an automatic instruction – or at least instructions that are 
given as soon as the defense meets the low threshold of adducing more than a 
mere scintilla of evidence.  The Bruner case might well have been resolved 
already, saving both parties from the pain and grief of ongoing litigation.137  
All in all, an automatic self-defense instruction, although potentially prob-
lematic in some situations, stands a good chance of improving the overall 
quality of justice in homicide trials. 
C.  Prejudice Analysis 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Missouri will have to address whether 
Bruner should be awarded a new trial.  Here, Judge Scott’s concurrence is 
most useful.  Judge Scott noted that, even if an instructional error had oc-
 
 133. See id. 
 134. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.07(a). 
 135. See State v. White, 92 S.W.3d 183, 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002), modified (Nov. 
26, 2002). 
 136. See id. 
 137. State v. Bruner, No. SD 33982, 2016 WL 4130831, at *7 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2016) (Scott, J., concurring). 
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curred, the appellant must prove he would have been prejudiced by the error 
and that the omitted instruction would have changed the verdict.138 
Given the facts, particularly that Bruner went to the theater armed and 
with passions inflamed,139 all who have written about the case seem to agree 
that Bruner acted with premeditation to kill Moore.140  Although Bruner was 
likely entitled to a self-defense instruction, the error could not have been so 
serious as to prejudice him. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
“Substantial evidence” need not be a source of obfuscation.  Even if 
Bruner’s conviction is affirmed through prejudice analysis, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri should seek a completely integrated definition of substan-
tial evidence to incorporate into Missouri law.  This Note argues that substan-
tial evidence would be better defined as evidence that is more than a mere 
scintilla that puts a matter in issue.  This test would ensure that juries retain 
the role of fact finders in jury trials.  Moreover, this test more clearly reflects 
the notion that in Missouri case law substantial evidence is a generous stand-
ard. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri must also decide when defendants in 
the future should receive a self-defense instruction.  Whether it be through an 
automatic self-defense instruction in homicide cases, or through clearly estab-
lishing a low bar for substantial evidence, allowing more defendants to re-
ceive a self-defense instruction would result in fairer trials and would more 
clearly separate the role of judges from that of juries. 
  
 
 138. Id. at *6. 
 139. See id. at *1–2 (majority opinion). 
 140. Even in Judge Lynch’s dissent, he qualifies his argument by insisting that the 
standard for receiving a self-defense instruction “is constant, regardless of how im-
probable the favorable evidence may be or how compelling the contrary evidence 
may be.”  Id. at *9 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
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APPENDIX A 
The tendered self-defense instruction read as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER [A] 
PART A – GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS  
One of the issues in this case is whether the use of force by the de-
fendant against Derek Moore was lawful.  In this state, the use of 
force, including the use of deadly force, to protect oneself is lawful in 
certain situations. 
In order for a person lawfully to use force in self-defense, he must rea-
sonably believe such force is necessary to defend himself from what 
he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. 
But, a person is not permitted to use deadly force unless he reasonably 
believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to protect himself 
against death or serious physical injury. 
As used in this instruction “deadly force” means physical force which 
is used with the purpose of causing or which a person knows to create 
a substantial risk of causing death or serious physical injury. 
As used in this instruction, the term “reasonably believe” means a be-
lief based on reasonable grounds, that is, grounds that could lead a 
reasonable person in the same situation to the same belief.  This de-
pends upon how the facts reasonably appeared.  It does not depend 
upon whether the belief turned out to be true or false. 
PART B – CASE-SPECIFIC STATEMENT OF LAW 
On the issue of self-defense as to Count I you are instructed as fol-
lows: First, if the defendant reasonably believed that the use of force 
was necessary to defend himself from what he reasonably believed to 
be the imminent use of unlawful force by Derek Moore, and 
Second, the defendant reasonably believed that the use of deadly force 
was necessary to protect himself from death or serious physical injury 
from the acts of Derek Moore, then his use of deadly force is justifia-
ble and he acted in lawful self-defense. 
The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in lawful self-defense.  Unless you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful self-defense 
under this instruction, you must find the defendant not guilty under 
Count I. 
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As used in the instruction, the term “serious physical injury” means 
physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes se-
rious disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
any part of the body.  
PART C – EVIDENTIARY MATTERS 
Evidence has been introduced of threats made by Derek Moore against 
defendant.  You may consider the evidence in determining who was 
the initial aggressor in the encounter. 
If any threats against defendant were made by Derek Moore and were 
known by or had been communicated to the defendant, you may con-
sider this evidence in determining whether the defendant reasonably 
believed that the use of force was necessary to defend himself from 
what he reasonably believed to be the imminent use of unlawful force 
by Derek Moore. 
You, however, should consider all of the evidence in the case in de-
termining whether the defendant acted in lawful self-defense. 
MAI-CR306.06A 




 141. Id. at *2 n.3 (majority opinion). 
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